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Abstract 
 
Hedge funds are collective investment vehicles fast becoming popular with high net worth 
individuals as well as institutional investors. These are funds that are often established 
with a special legal status that allows their investment managers a free hand to use 
derivatives, short sell, and exploit leverage to raise returns and cushion risk. Given that 
that they have substantial latitude to invest, it is instructive to examine the performance of 
hedge funds compared to other forms of managed funds. This paper provides an overview 
of hedge funds and discusses their empirical risk and return profiles. It also poses some 
concerns regarding the empirical measurements. Given the complexity of hedge fund 
investments, meaningful analytical methods are required to provide greater risk 
transparency and performance reporting. Hedge fund performance is also beset by a 
number of practical issues generating “practical risks”. These risks are not fully addressed 
by the usual risk-adjusted performance measures in the literature. A penalty function to 
discount these extraneous risk dimensions is proposed. The paper concludes that further 
empirical work is required to provide informative statistics about the risk and return of 
hedge funds.  
_______________________ 
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INVESTING IN HEDGE FUNDS: RISK, RETURN AND PITFALLS 
 
 
1. Background 
 
Since the early 1990s, there has been a growing interest in the use of hedge funds 
amongst both institutional and high net worth individuals. Due to their private nature, it is 
difficult to obtain adequate information about the operations of individual hedge funds and 
reliable summary statistics about the industry as a whole.  
 
Hedge funds are known to be growing in size and diversity. As at the end of 1997, the 
MAR/Hedge database recorded more than 700 hedge fund managing assets of US$ 90 
billion. See Table 1.  This is only a partial picture of the industry, as many funds are not 
listed with MAR/Hedge. In practical terms, it is not easy to estimate the current size of the 
hedge fund industry unless all funds are regulated or obligated to register their operations 
with a common authority. Brooks and Kat (2001) estimated that, as at April 2001, there are 
around 6000 hedge funds with an estimated US $400 billion in capital under management 
and US $1 trillion in total assets.  
 
While hedge funds are well established in the US and Europe, they have only begun to 
grow aggressively in Asia. In the week ending April 30, 2002 alone, 8 new funds were 
introduced or launched. These were fund initiated by familiar names like Merrill Lynch, 
Lazard, Morley, Societe Generale, HSBC and Crosby.  In year 2000, there were some 30 
funds that were established. They attracted about US$ 600 million in capital. Another 20 
hedge funds were set up in 2001. Many of these were start-ups and founded by talents 
who were previously employed by large institutional fund management companies.  In 
1999, HedgeFund Intelligence launched a new publication, AsiaHedge. Recently, 
AsiaHedge has also been set up 4 Asia-Pacific Hedge Fund Indices, covering funds in four 
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geographic areas: Japan, Asia ex-Japan, Asia inclusive of Japan and Australia. 
AsiaHedge currently has the reported data of about 150 hedge funds operating in Asia and 
Australia and/or investing in the Asia-Pacific markets. These hedge funds, like their 
counterparts in the U.S., use long/short, global/macro, and event driven strategies. 
 
Three interesting features differentiate hedge funds from other forms of managed funds. 
Most hedge funds are small and organized around a few experienced investment 
professionals. In fact, more than half of U.S Hedge Funds manage amounts of less than 
US$25 million. Further, most hedge funds are leveraged. It is estimated that 70 per cent of 
hedge funds use leverage and about 18% borrowed more than one dollar for every dollar 
of capital1. Another peculiar feature is the short life span of hedge funds. Hedge funds 
have an average life span of about 3.5 years.2 Very few have a track record of more than 
10 years. These features lead many to view hedge funds, as “risky” and “opportunistic”. 
 
2. What are hedge Funds? 
 
“Hedge Funds” is a term coined by journalist Carol Loomis to describe an innovative 
investment structure first created by Alfred Winslow Jones. Jones had established a fund 
with unique features: (a) He set up “hedges” by investing in securities that he determined 
as undervalued and funding these positions partly by taking short positions in overvalued 
securities, creating a “market neutral” position; (b) He also designed an incentive fee 
compensation arrangement in which he was paid a percentage of the profits realized from 
his clients’ assets; and (c) He invested his own investment capital in the fund, ensuring 
that his incentives and those of his investors were aligned and forming an investment 
“partnership”.  
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Currently, most hedge funds retain these features. They are set up as limited partnerships 
with a lucrative incentive-fee structure. Hedge fund managers also often have a significant 
portion of their own capital invested in the partnerships.  
 
However, the term “hedge fund” has also been generalized to describe investment 
strategies that range from the original “market-neutral” style of Jones to many other 
strategies and opportunistic situations, including global/macro investing, such as the 
Quantum Fund of George Soros. Soros is famous for his “attack” on Sterling in September 
1992, when he was reported to have a US$10 billion short position. He made $1 billion 
when the British Pound subsequently devalued. Soros shorted the Pound but was long the 
Yen.   
 
Due to the diversity of the industry, there is no standard method to classify hedge funds 
neatly. In the industry, there are at least 8 major databases set up by data vendors and 
fund advisors. We follow the classification used by Eichengreen and Mathieson (1998), 
who relied on the MAR/Hedge database. Under this classification, there are 8 categories 
of hedge funds with 7 differentiated styles and a fund-of-funds category: 
 
(a) Event driven funds. These are funds that take positions on corporate events, 
taking an arbitraged position when companies are undergoing re-structuring or 
mergers. For example, hedge funds would purchase bank debt or high yield 
corporate bonds of companies undergoing re-organization (often referred to as 
'distressed securities').  Another event-driven strategy is merger arbitrage. These 
funds seize the opportunity invest just after a takeover has been announced. They 
                                                                                                                                                    
1  See Eichengreen and Mathieson, pp. 7 
2  Stefano Lavinio, pp 128.  
 5
purchase the shares of the target companies and short the shares of the acquiring 
companies. Occasionally, they carried out the reverse if the deal would likely fail.  
 
(b) Global funds is a catchall category of funds that invest in non-US stocks and 
bonds with no specific strategy reference. It has the largest number of hedge 
funds. It includes funds that specialize on the emerging markets 
 
(c) Global/Macro funds refer to funds that rely on macroeconomic analysis to take 
bets on major risk factors, such as currencies, interest rates, stock indices and 
commodities.  
 
(d) Market neutral funds refer to funds that bet on relative price movements utilizing 
strategies such as long-short equity, stock index arbitrage, convertible bond 
arbitrage and fixed income arbitrage. Long-short equity funds use the strategy of 
Jones by taking long positions in selective stocks and going short on other stocks 
to limit their exposure to the stock market. Stock index arbitrage funds trade on the 
spread between index futures contracts and the underlying basket of equities. 
Convertible bond arbitrage funds typically capitalize on the embedded option in 
these bonds by purchasing them and shorting the equities. Fixed income arbitrage 
bet on the convergence of prices of bonds from the same issuer but with different 
maturities over time. This is the second largest grouping of hedge funds after the 
Global category. 
 
(e) Sector funds concentrate on selective sectors of the economy. For example, they 
may focus on technology stocks if these are over-priced and rotate across to other 
sectors. 
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(f) Short-sellers focus on engineering short positions in stocks with or without 
matching long positions. They play on markets that have risen too fast and on 
mean reversion strategies.   
 
(g) Long-only funds take long equity positions typically with leverage. Emerging 
market funds that do not have short-selling opportunities also fall under this 
category. 
 
(h) Fund of funds refer to funds that invests in a pool of hedge funds. They specialize 
in identifying fund managers with good performance and rely on their good industry 
relationships to gain entry into hedge funds with good track records. 
 
Table 1 presents statistics about the various categories of hedge funds and past 
performance. The sectoral hedge funds provided the best mean return over the period 
studied, while the “market-neutral” funds had the lowest standard deviation of returns.   On 
a risk-adjusted basis (dividing the mean return by the standard deviation), the category of 
fund that ranks highest is the market neutral funds followed by event-driven funds. But, 
before this conclusion is valid, more discussion follows on the empirical problems using 
the data obtained from incomplete databases. 
___________________ 
See Table 1 
___________________ 
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3. Why invest in hedge funds? 
 
Traditional asset allocation optimizes the use of equities, bonds, real estate and private 
equity to invest in a portfolio that maximizes returns and minimizes the portfolio risk.  With 
this objective, hedge funds become a natural candidate for consideration. Firstly, it is 
commonly believed that hedge funds may have superior returns. There are many 
anecdotal stories about the stunning success of hedge fund managers and their skills.  
Soros was reported to have obtained returns in excess of 30% p.a for a good number of 
years. From Table 1, there is also apparent evidence that hedge funds, as a group, have 
returns that are impressive. For example, over the period 1990-1997, all the hedge funds 
had positive absolute returns. Global/Macro funds obtained mean returns of 28.1% p.a. 
with a standard deviation that is comparable to equity funds.   
 
Secondly, hedge funds have returns that are generally believed to be uncorrelated to the 
traditional asset classes and may even have a lower risk profile. For example, Morgan 
Stanley Dean Witter (November 2000, p 1) reported that hedge funds “exhibit a low 
correlation with traditional asset classes, suggesting that hedge funds should play an 
important role in strategic asset allocation”. Table 2 shows a common presentation of the 
underlying relationships between hedge funds and the other assets.  
 
 
 
___________________ 
See Table 2 
___________________ 
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Thirdly in a bear market, many investment mangers find it uninteresting to merely beat the 
market index, which may have negative returns. They would have preferred to go short or 
avoid long positions to have positive returns. Investing in appropriately chosen hedge 
funds may provide the possibility of obtaining positive “absolute returns”.  
 
The foregoing provides persuasive reasons to consider hedge funds as “alternative 
investments”. However, relying on statistics culled from public databases is fraught with 
data biases. An uninformed investor may be misled into common misperceptions about 
the return and risk of hedge funds. There is now recent and definitive work by a number of 
authors that have provided fascinating revelations about the risk and return profiles of 
hedge funds which are discussed below. 
 
4. Commercial databases and Statistical Inferences 
 
Data Collation Issues 
Organized as private limited partnerships, and frequently as offshore investment vehicles, 
hedge funds generally do not disclose their activities to the public. This has resulted in 
frequent complaints about the lack of transparency. Fortunately, many funds do release 
selective information to publicize themselves and their performance to attract new 
investors. These data are collected by a small number of data vendors and fund advisors. 
A few large advisors and vendors are currently publishing performance data and 
indices/sub-indices periodically corresponding to the various investment strategies. A 
listing of Hedge Funds Databases and some descriptive details is provided in the 
Appendix.  
 
However, voluntary participation in performance reporting leads to incompleteness of 
information regarding the hedge fund population as a whole. Thus, sampling biases are 
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present whenever an investor analyses a hedge fund database on a stand-alone basis. 
Some of theses biases are briefly discussed below. 
 
Survivorship Bias 
Databases obviously only include hedge funds that submit information. Funds that perform 
poorly often choose not to submit their performance. Thus, poorly performing funds are 
likely to be missing in a database. A “survivorship bias” arises when a database includes 
only the performance of funds that are alive and present at the end of the sample period. A 
subset of survivorship bias, called liquidation bias, occurs when disappearing funds may 
not report final periods leading up to and including their liquidation. If funds cease 
operation due to poor performance, the historical returns of surviving funds in the 
database is biased upward with risk biased downward relative to the population of hedge 
funds. 
 
Hedge funds may exit a database for other reasons than poor performance. Database 
vendors often delist funds that do not provide reliable information. Some popular funds 
also stop reporting their performance when they have reached a desired size, and do not 
need to further solicit “new” money. Omissions of these funds would also severely bias a 
database.  
 
Brooks and Kat (2001) stated that around 30% of newly established funds do not survive 
the first three years, primarily due to poor performance. Thus, not including defunct funds 
is likely to lead to over-estimation of the returns and profile of hedge fund industry. Fung 
and Hsieh (2001a) found that estimates of survivorship biases differed across two 
commonly used databases, HFR and TASS.  The survivorship bias (and attrition rate) was 
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much higher in TASS than that in HFR. They estimated that survivorship bias would over-
report hedge fund mean returns by about 1.5% to 3% per annum. 
 
Selection Bias 
Database vendors impose their own criteria before a hedge fund may enter their database. 
The criteria would include the type of fund involved, track record and assets under 
management. Databases may also exclude types of hedge funds whose trading activities 
or instruments do not meet their criteria. Again, the result is a likely upward bias in the 
database, which has become a biased sample belonging to the larger population.3  
 
Data collation and statistical biases present problems when generalizations have to be 
made about the returns and risk across the different categories of hedge funds. These 
biases also affect the computation of hedge fund indices. Since this is so, statistical 
inferences about the performance of hedge fund returns and the returns on hedge fund 
indices may not be reliable.  
 
Brooks and Kat (2001) provided evidence to support this view. They showed that different 
databases have different sample statistics for similar categories of funds. Table 3 shows 
that while the mean return for macro hedge funds computed by the various databases 
ranges from 10.2% to 17.2%. Yet, this is a statistic for a common class of hedge funds 
over the same time-period. More interestingly, the standard deviation ranges from 19.3% 
to 50.2%. This is compelling evidence for the investor to be wary about obtaining statistics 
from hedge fund databases and making statistical inferences.  
                                                 
3 Park (1995) analyze a subset of selection bias termed “instant history bias”. This bias arises because when a 
new fund is first included, database managers often “back-fill” its performance history. Up to a year or more 
of data may be added to the database. Again, another sampling bias is added onto the database.  
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____________ 
See Table 3 
_____________ 
 
5. Nature of hedge funds, trading strategies and performance measurements  
 
Mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis 
 
It is clear that because of the method of collection and reporting of the hedge fund 
databases, there are biases in the data collected. Some of the returns can be viewed as 
the upper bound and the averages are likely to be smaller than actually reported. The wide 
range in returns and dispersion indicates that mean and variance may not capture the full 
picture regarding the activities of hedge funds. Indeed, the organization structure of hedge 
funds, their investment objectives, trading strategies and managerial compensation 
differentiate them significantly from the usual mutual fund. Most mutual funds are generally 
engaged in “buy-and-hold activities” – acquiring and managing stocks and bonds over a 
longer period of time. Although some mutual funds would engage in activities like leverage 
or short-sell, most do not.  
 
There is now increasing evidence that hedge fund returns and hedge fund indices returns 
are not normally distributed.  And, it is the strategies of hedge fund investments that have 
directly contributed to this situation. Typically, hedge fund investments are based on 
absolute return strategies. They are expected to deliver performance regardless of market 
conditions. To do so, hedge fund managers use two main approaches to achieve absolute 
return targets: (a) directional (or market timing) and (b) non-directional approaches. 
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The directional approach dynamically bets on the expected directions of the markets. 
Funds will invest long or sell-short securities to capture gains from their advance and 
decline. In contrast, the non-directional approach attempts to extract value from a set of 
embedded arbitrage opportunities within and across securities. The non-directional 
approach typically exploits structural anomalies in the financial market.  
 
Mean-variance analysis is appropriate when returns are normally distributed or investors’ 
preferences are quadratic. The reliability of mean-variance analysis therefore depends on 
the degree of non-normality of the returns data and the nature of the (non-quadratic) utility 
function. While the utility function may not be a serious problem, the non-normal 
distribution of returns presents an issue.  
 
According to Fung and Hsieh (1999a), “... when returns are not normally distributed (as it 
is the case for hedge funds), the first two moments (i.e. mean and standard deviation) are 
not sufficient to give an accurate probability.” Fung and Hsieh found that hedge fund 
returns are leptokurtic or fat-tailed. One likely explanation is that net returns include 
spreads that are distributed with fat tails.  
 
Brooks and Kat (2001) found that hedge fund index returns are also not normally 
distributed. Many hedge fund indices exhibit relatively low skewness and high kurtosis, 
especially in the case of funds investing in convertible arbitrage, risk arbitrage and 
distressed securities. These are non-normal profiles. Brooks and Kat argued that, while 
hedge funds may offer relatively high means and low variances, such funds give investors 
third and fourth moment attributes that are exactly the opposite to those that are desirable. 
Investors obtained a better mean and a lower variance in return for more negative 
skewness and higher kurtosis. There is no free lunch.  These issues complicate a clear 
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conclusion on the return and risk of hedge funds as an asset class for investment by even 
the most experienced investors. 
 
Generally, the dynamic trading strategies of hedge funds render traditional mean-variance 
measures relatively meaningless. While some hedge funds many have low standard 
deviations, this does not mean they are relatively “riskless”. In fact, they harbor skewness 
and kurtosis, which may be overwhelmingly “risky”.  
 
Correlations of Returns 
 
Fung and Hsieh (1997) examined the returns of hedge funds and commodity trading 
advisers. They confirmed that hedge fund managers and commodity trading advisers 
generate returns that have low correlations to the returns of mutual funds and standard 
asset classes. This is the benefit often cited by portfolio managers in their choice of hedge 
funds as an “alternative investment”. Having an additional asset with a low or negative 
correlation permits the diversification of risk in a means-variance environment.  
 
However, there are complications that arise in the case of hedge funds where correlation-
based diversification may not be valid. Lavino (2000, p177) argued that many hedge funds 
are not consistently and continuously negatively or poorly correlated with other asset 
classes over time.  Hedge funds also may not have meaningful standard deviations. In 
fact, many hedge funds have distributions with fat-tails, that is, exceptional events are 
more frequent than would have been predicted based on normality assumptions. This 
negates the use of correlation as a gauge to execute portfolio diversification.  
 
Fung and Hsieh (2001) stated that “… Risk management in the presence of dynamic 
trading strategies is also more complex.”  Hedge fund managers have a great deal of 
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freedom to generate returns that are uncorrelated with those of other asset classes. But, 
this freedom comes at a price. Dynamic trading strategies predispose hedge funds to 
extreme or tail events.  Thus, correlations may come at a cost. They cautioned that 
“periodically the portfolio can become overly concentrated in a small number of markets” 
and market exposures converge. This would lead to an “implosion” due to diversification.  
 
Lo (2001) reinforced this view. He explained that many investors participate in hedge 
funds to diversify their returns, as hedge fund returns seem uncorrelated with market 
indexes such as S&P 500. However, uncorrelated events can become synchronized in a 
crisis, with correlation changing from 0 to 1 overnight. These situations are examples of 
“phase-locking” behavior encountered in physical and natural science.  
 
We conclude that using means and standard deviations to report the returns and risks of 
hedge funds is not adequate. Providing skewness and kurtosis statistics would be helpful. 
Relying on simple correlation measures to diversify portfolio risks is not appropriate when 
deciding to add hedge funds to a portfolio of other assets.  
 
 
6. Some suggested measures to measure risk and return 
 
Sortino and Price (1994) have proposed evaluating downside risks rather than total risks. 
They defined a new measure and termed it the Sortino Ratio. This is similar to the Sharpe 
Ratio, except that it uses 'downside deviation' instead of using standard deviation as the 
denominator.  
 
The Sortino Ratio was developed to differentiate between deviations on the upside and on 
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the downside and is more consistent with the investors' concern over risk of losses in their 
investments. The Sortino ratio also allows for the setting of a user-defined return 
benchmark where the numerator is the difference between the return on the portfolio and 
the Minimum Acceptable Return (MAR). The MAR is usually the risk free rate, zero or 
user-defined (for example, 5%) 
 
We have earlier highlighted that the high skewness of a hedge fund's returns may be 
connected to the hedge fund manager's selection of high-reward and low variance 
opportunities. Lavinio (1999) has defined another measure to capture this, as follows: 
 
d-Ratio = Abs (d/U) 
where, 
  d = number of returns less than zero times their value 
  U = number of returns greater than zero times their value 
  Abs = absolute value. 
 
The d-Ratio compares the value and frequency of a manager's winners to losers to 
capture the skewness in returns. This statistic, which does not require any assumption of 
the underlying distribution, may be used as a proxy for a fund's risk, with d=0 representing 
a distribution with no downside, and d = infinity representing one in which the manager 
does not make any positive returns. 
 
In analyzing the performance of hedge fund managers, we also need to gain insights into 
the permanence of a manager's skill. One way to examine if good performance is merely 
transitory is to see if it is mean-reverting (i.e. whether the performance will reverse and 
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converge toward some predictable long-term value). We can capture this with the Hurst 
Ratio4, which is defined as follows: 
 
Hurst Ratio  =  log M / (log N - log a)  
where 
    M(t)  =  (max(t) - min(t))/S(t) 
N  =  length of shorter sub-periods into which a 
manager's return record has been sub-divided 
t  = number of sub-periods into which a manager's  
return record has been sub-divided 
S(t)  =  standard deviation of data over sub-period t 
a  =  constant term that is negligible if track record  
is five years or less. 
 
A Hurst Ratio between 0 and 0.5 means that a manager's return will tend to fluctuate 
randomly, but converge to a stable value over time. With a Hurst Ratio around 0.5, a 
hedge fund manager's track performance will be regarded as totally random, i.e. returns in 
one period are not affected by returns in another period. Such hedge funds are deemed to 
be “risky” as any stellar short-term gains may be accompanied by substantial losses in 
another time period.  
 
Hurst Ratios, which are between 0.5 and 1, describe returns that are persistent. These 
fund managers have “hot” hands. We should, however, interpret such findings with care, 
as there is a need to examine whether the same manager can maintain his fund’s Hurst 
                                                 
4  Lo (1991) applied the Hurst Ratio to stock returns and found that short-range dependence adequately 
captured the time series behavior of stock returns. 
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Ratio in future time-periods that are beyond the chosen sampling periods. More rigorous 
testing is required with out-of-sample data to provide meaningful conclusions.  
 
Though the Sortino, d and Hurst Ratios would provide additional insights to the 
performance and risk of hedge fund investing, further work is needed before these 
analytical methods can be used to report on the risk and return performance of hedge 
funds. In the next section, we examine some practical issues that complicate hedge fund 
performance.  
 
7. Practical Issues 
 
We have seen that data issues may unwittingly lead to meaningless comparisons of hedge 
fund performance. However, even if one possesses a set of clean and reliable data, it is 
unlikely that there will be a statistically computed measure of risk-adjusted return, which 
would satisfy a sophisticated investor. Hedge funds performance measures are beset by 
many practical business issues, which make it extremely difficult to have a simple 
measure to fully convey risk and return.   
 
Specifically, hedge funds face many practical issues that increase their “riskiness.”  For 
ease of exposition, we have identified at least 6 types of practical issues that confound risk 
and return measurements: style purity, consistency, fund size, use of leverage, liquidity 
and asset concentration. We note that some of these problems are closely linked to one 
another and create extraneous risks, which may not be correctly priced by the usual risk-
adjusted return measures.   
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Firstly, many hedge funds are assumed to have a pure and consistent style. This is rarely 
the case. Many funds may be opportunistic and operate with more than one style. Thus, 
many hedge funds do not always function exactly as their self-reported classifications 
indicate. From the outside looking in, it is almost impossible to classify hedge funds neatly. 
 
A hedge fund’s style purity over time is definitely less consistent when compared to Unit 
Trusts (and mutual funds), which by nature are “buy-and-hold” accounts. Fung and Hsieh 
(2001b) and others have suggested using factor analysis to discern the underlying 
dimensions or “factors” that drive the returns for funds. This may, then, go below the 
surface to determine unique hedge fund strategies that differentiate one fund from 
another. Hopefully, this would enable an investor to detect style purity, style consistency 
and most importantly, style deviations.   
 
Till (2001a and 2001b) suggested that a number of hedge fund strategies might appear to 
“earn their returns due to assuming risk positions in a risk-averse financial world, rather 
than from inefficiencies in the market place.” In this sense, returns are made from a “risk 
transfer”, and not due to managerial abilities per se.  If indeed this is the case, then the 
skill of selecting the appropriate hedge fund styles and the type of managers who can 
execute the styles consistently, and how to allocate funds across these managers become 
important to achieve superior returns. Viewed from this standpoint, style purity and 
consistency are important attributes to measure exposure to hedge fund risks rather than 
statistical measures like variance and skewness.  
 
A hedge fund’s asset under management ("AUM") growth may be (a) internally generated 
through performance, (b) externally induced because of inflows, or (c) magnified through 
use of higher leverage. Hedge fund size is a dimension that has significant implications for 
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risk and return.  A hedge fund’s risks increases proportionately with its AUM. This is 
because the use of specialized strategies naturally limits a hedge fund to some “optimal 
size” beyond which it becomes increasingly difficult to keep the same strategy or have the 
opportunities for execution (often with leverage). We observe that hedge fund managers 
are inclined to close their funds for further investments as soon as a target size is reached. 
This is evidence that many managers understand the trade-offs between size and 
performance. Yet, many often neglect to focus on the relationship between size and risks. 
 
Hedge fund managers are drawn to the use of leverage to magnify potential returns from 
small arbitrage opportunities. They are also inclined to concentrate their investable funds 
in a small subset of potentially “rich” opportunities. Weisman and Abernathy (2000) 
demonstrated the importance of guarding against excessive leverage, which is 
compounded by a lack of liquidity when a disastrous event strikes. He pointed out that if 
one were to construct a non-diversified, illiquid and/or leveraged portfolio and let it grow 
over time, it would eventually lead to bankruptcy of the fund, if a misfortune strikes. The 
potential risk is very high employing these strategies. The perceived risk may be low, as 
a well-constructed downside-oriented measure using past data may not reveal the 
potential risks from the occurrence of a future disastrous event. This is because a 
misfortune has not yet struck. But the potential risks, which are usually unforeseen, are 
large and threaten the eventual survival of the fund. 
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8.  Accounting for Various Sources of Risk 
 
Assume we have two hedge funds with similar statistical attributes: the same average 
holding period returns adjusted by its standard deviation. We want to know which fund has 
a better "risk-adjusted" return. Let us further assume that the first fund (compared to the 
second) is less leveraged, invests in more liquid assets, is less concentrated/ more 
diversified, and more disciplined in its application of investment styles. We are, most likely, 
very inclined to prefer the first fund to the second. That is because the second fund, 
although it has the same average return adjusted by its standard deviation, has taken 
extraneous risk to achieve the same results. This is especially more obvious if analyzed in 
the context of possible disastrous events. Thus, depending on the strategy employed, it is 
generally correct to say that a non-leveraged, more liquid, more diversified and more 
disciplined fund has a better chance of survival in the long term. 
 
Perhaps, the crucial question has now become more obvious: how to modify “risk-adjusted 
returns” to account for the many other forms of risks not captured statistically. Generally, 
“risk-adjusted return" is defined as: 
(Observed Returns – Benchmark Returns)  
    Indicated Risk Measure 
 
This measure assumes that all the named variables are observable, measurable and 
reliable. The benchmark return may be a stock index, a contrived peer measure or the 90-
day Treasury Bill rate of interest. The risk measure may be the “tracking error“,  “standard 
deviation”, or some other measure.   
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From the foregoing, we are sanguine that this risk-adjusted measure will be able to tell the 
whole story. We propose, instead, a new metric to account for the numerous risks faced 
by a hedge fund investor. We define:    
 
Risk Adjusted Return  =  (Observed Returns – Benchmark Returns)   X    Penalty Function  
Indicated Risk Measure 
 
 
Without delving into the statistical properties in this paper, we postulate that the Penalty 
Function is a discount factor that takes into account various dimensions such as hedge 
fund style (purity and consistency), size, leverage, liquidity and asset concentration. These 
dimensions penalize the statistically measured risk-adjusted returns of hedge funds.  
Table 4 itemizes the risk dimensions and suggests avenues to discount them in the 
penalty function.   
 
____________ 
See Table 4 
_____________ 
 
It should be noted that the leverage, liquidity and concentration measures require 
additional data supplied by hedge fund managers. This calls for more disclosure and 
transparency from the hedge fund managers. 
 
 
While no single performance measure can be complete, we argue that a properly 
constructed "risk-adjusted return with penalty” that has accounted for practical business 
risks is more meaningful to an investor. A return that is merely adjusted by standard 
deviations cannot alert an investor to such risks as leverage or liquidity, which had been 
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undertaken (to achieve the returns). Using a penalty function would provide a handle to 
scale the observed return for the many practical risks that had been assumed by the 
hedge fund manager. Even identifying the components that will constitute the penalty 
function would be a worthwhile exercise to avoid the pitfalls of investing in hedge funds. 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
The paper presented an overview of hedge funds, describing their development and 
characteristics. It also surveys some of the pitfalls that investors face when they try to 
make investment decisions using hedge fund data from commercial sources. Given the 
dynamic trading strategies and the complexity of hedge fund investments, commonly used 
statistics such as mean, standard deviation and correlations are not meaningful.  These 
statistics must be used with extreme caution as the underlying distribution of hedge fund 
returns (and also the returns of hedge fund indices) is not normally distributed.  
 
This paper has suggested 3 other metrics that may be useful: Sortino, d, and the Hurst 
Ratios. However, more empirical work is needed before they are used.  A future paper will 
provide some empirical results relating to these measures.  
 
Without specifying the mathematical form, we venture further to account for various other 
sources of risk such as style purity, style consistency, size, leverage, liquidity, and asset 
concentration. We also suggested a "penalty function" for the risks from these sources. 
The statistical properties of this penalty as well as illustrations using real data are left for 
future work. 
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We conclude by noting that many authors have pointed to the limited use of statistical 
measures and have suggested option-based analytical approaches to evaluate hedge 
fund performance. In particular, the works by Hsieh and Fung (1997, 1999b) and Agarwal 
and Naik (1999) have discussed these avenues to provide insights into these complex but 
crucial issues in hedge funds investing. In this paper, we have also suggested using more 
dimensions to alert investors to the numerous sources of unseen risks when they invest in 
hedge funds. This is a promising direction for more research.    
 
 
Table 1 
MAR Hedge Fund Categories: December 1997 
Mean and Standard Deviation of Returns (1990-1997) 
 
 
1990-1997   
Category 
 
Number 
 
Assets 
(US$ 
billion) 
Mean 
Return 
(%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%) 
Risk-
adjusted 
Returns 
 
Event-driven 
 
120 8.6 18.9 5.9 3.2 
Global 334 
 
30.9 17.7 9.4 1.9 
Global/macro 61 
 
29.8 28.1 16.3 1.7 
Market neutral 201 
 
18.0 8.6 2.1 4.1 
Sectors 
 
40 1.8 29.6 15.9 1.9 
Short-sellers 
 
12 0.5 7.0 15.2 0.5 
Long-only 
 
15 0.4 27.3 15.4 1.8 
 
Source: Eichengreen et al. (1998, pp 37) 
 
Notes:  
(a) The mean returns are annually compounded returns over the period 1990 to 1997, except for the Long-
only Funds, which were computed from 1994 tom1997. 
(b) The annualized standard deviations were computed from of the standard deviation of monthly returns for 
each investment style.  
(c) Risk-adjusted returns are obtained by dividing the mean return by the standard deviation.  
 
 24
Table 2 
Performance Measures For Hedge Fund Indices 
(Jan 1990 - April 2000) 
 
 Annualized 
Return 
(%) 
Annualized 
Std Dev 
(%) 
Correlation with 
S&P 500 
Correlation with 
Lehman Bro 
Gov/Corp 
EACM 1001 15.2 4.4 0.37 0.19 
Eq Mkt Neutral 9.1 3.2 -0.11 0.15 
Eq Hedged 20.6 10.3 0.20 0.00 
Event 13.7 5.4 0.48 0.09 
Global/Intl 20.8 11.5 0.61 0.15 
 
Source: Lehman Brothers (2000) 
 
Notes: 
1. The EACM 100 is an index of hedge funds representing a wide range of strategies 
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Table 3 
Hedge Fund Indices from Different Databases 
Mean and Standard Deviation of Returns (Jan 1995-Apr 2001) 
 
Category/Database Mean (%) Standard 
Deviation (%) 
Risk Arbitrage1 
Zurich2 
Hennesse 
Tuna 
Altvest 
HFR 
14.13 
13.2 
13.0 
14.9 
15.6 
13.6 
 
12.8 
11.8 
12.4 
13.4 
12.7 
Macro 
Zurich 
Hennesse 
HFR 
CSFB/Tremont 
Tuna 
Altvest 
Van 
13.3 
10.2 
10.4 
13.2 
17.2 
15.6 
17.0 
9.4 
 
19.3 
30.6 
28.1 
50.2 
33.8 
32.6 
41.8 
Equity Market Neutral 
Zurich 
Hennesse 
HFR 
CSFB/Tremont 
Tuna 
HFR 
12.8 
11.9 
8.5 
10.9 
13.7 
15.2 
16.8 
 
6.5 
10.4 
13.3 
10.8 
19.2 
17.2 
Market Indices 
S&P 500 
DJIA 
Russell 2000 
NASDAQ 
Lehman Government Bond 
 
18.6 
18.1 
13.7 
21.6 
7.4 
 
54.4 
54.7 
69.1 
106.9 
10.3 
 
Source: Brooks & Kat (2001) 
 
Notes: 
1. The major databases are explained in the Appendix 
2. Zurich Capital Markets computes the indices using the MAR/Hedge database that it acquired in 
March 2001. 
3. Simple Average of returns estimated using the different databases. 
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Table 4 
Discount to Risk-Adjusted Returns to Account for Various Types of Practical Risk 
 
 
 
Sources Of 
Risks 
 
To Penalise for Suggested Measurement 
method 
Predicted Discount 
to Returns 
Style Purity 
 
 
Deviation from Self-
reported Investment 
Style  
 
Deviation from Style 
Benchmark 
The higher the style 
“impurity” the higher 
the discount 
 
Style 
Consistency 
 
 
Style Inconsistency Deviation from Factors Models The higher the style 
“inconsistency” the 
higher the discount 
 
Asset Growth 
 
 
Unexpected 
increases in Fund 
Size (and Assets 
Under Management) 
 
 
Change in Fund Size The higher the 
increase in fund size 
in the period under 
review, the higher the 
discount 
 
Leverage 
 
 
Excessive Leverage (a) Average gross exposure  
(b) Active Use of Leverage  
 
(Computed from a comparison 
of returns with and without the 
use of leverage following the 
standards recommended by 
the Association for Investment 
Management and Research) 
 
 
The higher the use of 
leverage the higher 
the discount. 
 
Liquidity Low Asset Liquidity (a) Average Day to Complete    
Sales  
 
(b) Ratio of Position to Trading 
Volume 
 
The higher the threat 
of  “illiquidity” the 
higher the discount 
 
Asset 
concentration  
 
 
 
(a) Single Security 
Exposure 
 
 
(b) Erratic Returns 
(a) Average Percentage of 10 
Largest Holding over reporting 
period  
 
(b) Fractal Dimension or 
Inverse of Hurst Ratio 
 
The higher the asset 
concentration the 
higher the discount 
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APPENDIX 
List of Commercial Hedge Fund Databases 
 
Name Description Features of Indices 
HFR (www.hfr.com) Hedge Fund Research (HFR) is a 
hedge fund research and 
consulting firm that has collected 
data on around 4,000 different 
hedge funds. 
Around 1,500 funds are used to 
calculate 33 indices that reflect the 
monthly net of fee returns on 
equally weighted baskets of funds. 
Zurich Capital Markets 
(www.marhedge.com) 
Originally developed by Managed 
Accounts Reports (MAR) but it was 
sold to Zurich Capital Markets in 
Mar 2001. 
Database contains 1,500 hedge 
funds, which are used to calculate 
19 indices that reflect median 
monthly net of fee returns. 
CSFB/Tremont 
(www.hedgeindex.com) 
The TASS database tracks around 
2,600 funds. There are strict rules 
for fund selection. The universe 
consists only of funds with a 
minimum of USD 10m under 
management and a current audited 
financial statement. Funds are re-
selected quarterly as necessary. 
Using a subset of around 650 
funds, CSFB/Tremont calculates 10 
indices that the monthly net of fee 
returns on an asset-weighted 
basket of funds. Large fund have a 
larger influence in these indices. 
Hennesse 
(www.henessegroup.com) 
The Hennesse Group is a hedge 
fund advisory firm that maintains a 
database of around 3000 funds. 
Based of subset of about 500 
funds, Hennessee calculates 23 
indices that reflect the monthly net 
of fee returns on equally weighted 
basket of funds. 
Van (www.vanhedge.com) Van Hedge Fund Advisors is a 
hedge fund advisory firm with a 
database of about 3,400 funds. 
Using a subset of around 500 
funds, Van calculates 15 indices 
that reflect the monthly net of fees 
returns on equally-weighted 
baskets of funds 
Altvest (www.altvest.com) Altvest is hedge fund website that 
provides information on alternative 
investments. The Altvest database 
contains information on around 
2000 hedge funds. 
Altvest calculates 14 equally 
weighted indices from the monthly 
net of fee returns of the funds in its 
database. 
TUNA 
(www.hedgefund.net) 
Hedgefund.net is a website 
providing free hedge fund 
information and performance data. 
Its database covers 1,800 hedge 
funds. 
Hedgefund.net calculates 35 
equally weighted indices from the 
monthly net of fee returns of the 
funds in its database. In Tuna's 
case, if a fund shuts down, it is 
completely removed from the 
indices5 
AsiaHedge 
(www.hedgefundintelligence.com) 
AsiaHedge is a subscription 
database that provides information 
on hedge fund industry in the Asia 
Pacific Region. Publishes a league 
table of 156 funds. 
AsiaHedge establish the Bank of 
Bermuda AsiaHedge indices. There 
are 4 indices to measure the 
performance of hedge funds in 4 
geographies based on the median 
net of fee returns of funds in its 
league table. 
Source: Brooks and Kat (2001), Hedge Fund Intelligence 
                                                 
5 Estimated returns may suffer from survivor bias (ranging from 1.5-3%). Around 30% of newly established 
funds do not survive beyond 3 years. Most data vendors (with the exception of TUNA) do incorporate funds 
that have ceased to exist in their index to avoid this. 
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